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ABSTRACT 
Since September 12, 2001, The Florida Urban Search and Rescue System 
(FLUSAR) in Florida has grown from a nascent system to a full-fledged, multi-tiered, 
statewide search and rescue system. Through an urgent need for Urban Search and 
Rescue (US&R) capabilities, good planning and a unity of purpose after September 11, 
2001, Florida was able to establish a system that is emulated by other states. However, 
due to a lack of state control, sustainable funding, a strategic plan and policies to protect 
integral members from professional liability, the system is in jeopardy of ceasing to exist. 
If this were to occur, Florida could not adequately protect its citizens during emergencies 
that cause structural collapse. 
By examining the qualitative information gleaned from the literature review, a 
survey of state US&R systems,  interviews with personnel who were involved with the 
establishment of FLUSAR, or have a role in other state’s US&R systems, and the 
author’s experience with the FLUSAR system with state and local governments, this 
thesis will also evaluate the present capability of the US&R system within the state of 
Florida and provide a description of where FLUSAR has been, where it is today and to 
recommend changes for the future. In order to ensure the highest degree of performance 
and accountability to the citizens of Florida, including recognizing the real strength of  a 
US&R system is one that is based on the rapid, local and regional response of specially 
trained US&R teams and task forces from within a state, the author will recommend that 
the Florida Division of State Fire Marshal establish a US&R advisory board and US&R 
program coordinator and dedicate sufficient funding to support an Advisory Board and 
US&R program coordinator and that the Florida Division of State Fire Marshal should be 
the agency in charge of the state US&R system, or FLUSAR.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Along with the events of September 11, 2001; August 29, 2005; and the 
subsequent days after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, disaster events of the past 
decade have shaken the American public’s confidence in the government’s ability to 
protect the homeland from various forms of disaster. It is important that Florida’s 
government leaders take steps to ensure that the state is safe and is prepared to respond to 
events of significant consequence. One discipline of response to incidents of significant 
consequence is urban search and rescue (US&R). 
Urban search and rescue is considered an “all hazards” discipline, as it may be 
needed for a variety of emergencies or disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes,  
storms and tornadoes, floods, dam failures, technological accidents, terrorist activities, 
and hazardous materials releases. The events may be slow in developing, as in the case of 
hurricanes, or sudden, as in the case of tornadoes and building collapse. 
Since September 12, 2008, the Urban Search and Rescue System in Florida 
(FLUSAR) has grown from a nascent system to a full-fledged statewide search and 
rescue system. Through planning and visioning, collaboration and negotiations with other 
disciplines, Florida was able to establish a system that is emulated by other states. 
However, due to a lack of state control, a strategic plan, state funding and policies to 
protect non-fire service members of the task forces that provide important services, the 
system is at risk of ceasing to exist. This is especially important because Florida’s 
economic prosperity depends on travel and tourism, and its citizens and visitors have the 
right to feel and be safe. Additionally, there already has been a significant investment of 
resources and time in developing the US&R system in Florida. 
A recent Operational Readiness Evaluation of the US&R system in Florida, 
published documents on the federal US&R system, and the author’s experience of 
working with the existing Florida system since 2001, has shown that the state of Florida 
has a very good US&R system, but it needs to prepare for the future. The author believes 
the enactment of state control of FLUSAR by the Division of State Fire Marshal will 
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solve the identified problems, ensure system accountability, reduce liability for mission 
critical civilian positions, and allow for a more effective use of resources to fund the 
operations. 
It is recognized with this suggestion comes a requisite increase in state funding; 
however, an incremental phase-in approach to funding is recommended. This phased-in 
funding process can be part of the strategic planning process. As benchmarks in the 
planning process are met, commensurate funding can be put in place. The benefit of this 
process would be a “forward thinking” planning process that would give legislators the 
ability to plan for funding increases. The increased cost to the state will be offset by the 
new system and the added benefits of consistency, accountability and effectiveness in 
responding to the aftermath of man-made or natural disasters. 
Additionally, the author concedes there are political considerations related to 
resource allocation for any initiative during difficult economic times, even a homeland 
security initiative. However, it is not the author’s intent to examine these considerations 
as part of this thesis. The author will save that topic for further scholarly inquiry. This 
thesis focuses solely on the US&R system in Florida and suggests future direction based 
on the research and the author’s experience working within the system. 
A. BACKGROUND 
It has been stated in recent federal government documents, while policy and 
strategic planning for international terrorism and natural disasters are principally a federal 
responsibility, in light of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and presidential 
directives, states must do more to plan for these types of incidents (Bea, 2006).  
After September 11, 2001, Governor Jeb Bush formally directed state agencies to 
immediately complete a comprehensive strategic assessment of Florida’s capability to 
prevent, mitigate, and respond to these types of incidents. Governor Bush further directed 
that the assessment examine the state’s capabilities regarding training programs, 
equipment, and execution protocols, with particular focus on preventing an event and 
mitigating the aftermath related to an event of significant consequence occurring in the 
state (Caruson & MacManus, 2008). 
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The governor requested a report be completed within ten working days. Using the 
existing networks of law enforcement, firefighters, emergency medical services, 
emergency management, and selected private sector partners, these workgroups collected 
information about Florida’s existing capabilities and capacities. The compiled 
information provided valuable insight into the status of Florida’s domestic security 
preparedness and exposed a significant weakness in the state’s ability to respond to an 
incident that required urban search and rescue (R. Napoli, peronal communication, 
September 1, 2009). 
In Florida’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the Director of State 
Fire Marshal (SFM) Emergency Coordinating Officer (ECO) is responsible for 
Emergency Support Function (ESF) 9, Search and Rescue (Florida Department of 
Emergency Management, 2004). This includes urban search and rescue, which involves 
the location, rescue (extrication), and initial medical stabilization of victims trapped in 
confined spaces where technical expertise and equipment are required beyond the normal 
fire service response. 
Structural collapse is most often the cause of victims being trapped, but victims 
may also be trapped in transportation accidents, collapsed trenches and severe flooding. 
US&R is considered a “multi-hazard” discipline, as it may be needed for a variety of 
emergencies or disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, storms and tornadoes, floods, 
dam failures, technological accidents, or terrorist activities. US&R task forces are 
categorized or “typed” according to operational capability (minimum training, staffing 
and equipment required, and the initial operating period). 
Subject matter experts (SMEs) reviewed and analyzed the information and 
develop recommendations for strengthening Florida's safety and security framework. 
These subject matter experts included sheriff, police, fire, and emergency services 
professionals, as well as private sector partners critical in maintaining public and 
government services. The SMEs’ recommendations were reviewed, validated and 
approved by the chief executives of state, county, and municipal agencies with 
emergency responsibilities in Florida. 
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The primary recommendations for strengthening Florida’s ability to respond to an 
incident of significant consequence that required US&R was to enhance the existing 
response capability of the two Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
affiliated US&R task forces, Florida Task Force 1 (FL-TF 1—Miami-Dade Fire Rescue) 
and Florida Task Force 2 (FL-TF 2—City of Miami Fire Rescue and other supporting 
agencies). This was a priority because during this period, both of these US&R task forces 
were deployed to New York City to assist with the rescue operations occurring at the 
World Trade Center site. This left Florida without formalized US&R capability if another 
event of significant consequence occurred. 
According to Casey (personal communication, June 20, 2009), by virtue of its 
ESF 9 responsibility, Governor Bush directed the SFM to ensure the state is not left void 
of US&R capabilities if FL-TF 1 and TF 2 are deployed out of state. To ensure this, a 
statewide US&R system, known as the Florida Urban Search and Rescue System 
(FLUSAR) was developed.  From 2001 to 2004, seven urban search and rescue task 
forces comprised of over 750 members were organized in addition to the two 
aforementioned FEMA task forces (D.A. Casey, personal communication, June 20, 
2009). These US&R task forces are available for local response, regional response, 
statewide response, and, as in the case of Hurricane Katrina, an interstate response. 
The FLUSAR response system provides a coordinated response to disasters in 
urbanized environments. Special emphasis is placed on the capability to locate and 
extricate victims trapped in collapsed buildings, from light residential construction to 
heavily reinforced concrete structures. A unique component to the Florida system is the 
Type II Technical Rescue Teams (TRT). Fifty-three teams consisting of local fire 
department personnel are available for immediate local, regional and statewide response. 
These teams utilize the regular fire department staffing, but with specially trained 
members have a higher search and rescue training level and are equipped with a light-
duty US&R equipment package provided through the above process. . 
The state of Florida is the only state that has TRTs as part of its US&R system 
available as a state resource for statewide deployment to initially deploy before the nine 
US&R task forces. According to Mayers (personal communication, August 18, 2009), 
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other states have wanted to emulate this component of the state US&R system. Since its 
inception, FLUSAR has proven its value repeatedly, with numerous responses to the 
hurricanes of 2004 and 2005 (including interstate response to Mississippi after Hurricane 
Katrina), and to the Central Florida tornadoes of 2007. 
The SFM, Florida Association of Search and Rescue (FASAR), Florida Fire 
Chief’s Association (FFCA), the Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC) and the 
State Working Group on Domestic Security all have been instrumental in the process of 
developing this comprehensive statewide US&R system, as well as standardized training 
programs and equipment lists. The SFM has acted as the “pass-through” agency ensuring 
appropriate use of over $50 million of federal Homeland Security Grant Program funds to 
establish, equip and train the FLUSAR system, including the construction of a state-of-
the-art US&R training prop on the grounds of the Florida State Fire College in Ocala. 
The present composition of FLUSAR is made up entirely of local fire department 
resources. Several of the task forces and TRTs are actually comprised of multiple local 
departments. These local entities use a combination of local funds and federal funds that 
are reimbursed to the SFM after completion of approved equipment purchases and/or 
training. Presently, state funds are not appropriated by the state legislature for the 
FLUSAR system. This will be shown later to be a contributing factor to the tenuous 
nature of FLUSAR’s future existence. 
The participating agencies maintain the capability of rapidly deploying resources 
based on the reported magnitude of the incident. The system is based on a tiered response 
that ensures the proper response of the closest appropriate resources for the incident, and 
is managed through the State Emergency Response Plan. This plan is a document that has 
been developed by the Florida Fire Chief’s Association (2008) and is operated in 
conjunction between SFM at ESF 9 at the State Emergency Operations Center, FFCA, 
which provides the logistical support and resources for enactment of the plan, and 
FASAR, which provides the US&R specific technical experts.. 
The present FLUSAR system is very comprehensive, which is a credit to the 
personnel involved in the vision of FLUSAR and the present members. However, the 
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present decentralized structure requires a high degree of collaboration between these 
three agencies, and, according to Quinn (personal communication, May 30, 2009) and 
Casey (personal communication, June 20, 2009), this decentralization can lead to 
communication and leadership issues. Determining who is in charge of the “system” may 
be dependent on whether it is activated for an emergency or not. This can cause conflict 
and confusion and lead to an ineffective and inefficient way to use resources in an 
emergency setting. 
In August 2008, the state of Florida Urban Search and Rescue System underwent 
its first Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE). The ORE was conducted by an outside 
evaluator who used subject matter experts from within FLUSAR. The evaluator has 
conducted OREs on the FEMA task forces and the FLUSAR OREs were conducted in the 
similar fashion using the same criteria. The purpose of the ORE was twofold: 1) To 
evaluate the Operational Capabilities of the FLUSAR system, and, 2) To ensure fiscal 
accountability for the reimbursed Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security 
Grant Program (HSGP) funds distributed to Florida’s nine urban search and rescue task 
forces and the 53 light technical rescue teams.  
Conducting an Operational Readiness Evaluation was a requirement of the sub-
grant agreement the Division of State Fire Marshal had with the Florida Division of 
Emergency Management who acted as the State Administrative Agency for use of the 
State Homeland Security Grant funding and Urban Area Security Initiative grant funding. 
The SFM acts as the “pass through” agency for State Homeland Security Grant funding 
for Florida’s US&R system. 
More specifically, the ORE looked at the following areas: 
• Operational Readiness—availability of a complement of deployable, 
trained, exercised, qualified personnel and disaster search canines. 
• Logistic Readiness—availability of a complete equipment cache and 
other logistic resources to support immediate deployment. 




processes, and procedures to support immediate deployments, and meet 
requirements of Funding Agreements and other audit requirements. 
(Florida State Fire, 2008) 
Florida was the first state in the United States to undergo this critical self-analysis 
of capabilities and financial stewardship relating to use of State Homeland Security Grant 
Program funds for US&R purposes. This was a benefit to the state and FLUSAR because 
as Quinn (personal communication, May 30, 2009) indicated no other state had 
participated in a validation process such as this. This process was transparent that showed 
federal grant funding was used appropriately and a state US&R system was created and 
maintained with this funding. 
As indicated by the high overall scores, the FLUSAR system exhibited many 
strengths. Among them were good financial recording keeping, good training record 
keeping and a sufficient equipment cache to maintain the mission. However, as expected, 
the ORE also outlined several weaknesses. 
The main weaknesses identified were: 
• lack of a central control over FLUSAR 
• the lack of a strategic plan that outlines the future of FLUSAR 
• lack of liability protection for key task force positions that are non-fire 
service based 
• lack of dedicated funding to maintain the equipment cache and training 
requirements of FLUSAR. 
These weaknesses threaten the viability and sustainability of FLUSAR. With the 
recent passage of legislation in Florida to reduce property taxes, it is doubtful in today’s 
economic climate that FLUSAR task forces will be able to sustain solely on local 
funding. If the FLUSAR cannot be sustained, the agencies that comprise the task forces 
of FLUSAR will no longer be able to provide the resources and the system will cease to 
exist. This will leave the state of Florida without US&R coverage in the event the two 
FEMA US&R task forces are deployed out of the state. 
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Additionally, if FLUSAR were to cease to exist, the removal of the TRT resource 
removes light technical rescue and US&R capability from the local communities that 
possess these teams. Without these resources, Florida will lack the ability to provide 
US&R. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Due to the use of specialized rescue tools, training and techniques that comprise 
Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) in response to man-made and natural disasters, US&R 
is an integral part of a homeland security system, whether at the national, state or local 
level. Prior to September 11, 2001, US&R had primarily been the responsibility of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 28 team national US&R program (personal 
interviews, 2009). Responses to incidents that required US&R in Florida, throughout the 
southeast United States and much of the world has previously been handled by FEMA’s 
two Type I Task Forces located in Miami-Dade County, Florida Task Force 1 (FL-TF1 
Miami-Dade Fire Rescue) and Florida Task Force 2 (FL-TF2 City of Miami Fire 
Rescue).  
According to Campbell (2004) the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the 
US&R response to both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, caused many states to 
re-evaluate their role in US&R. This was through the perception of limitations of the 
federal US&R system, and the sudden appearance of federal homeland security grant 
funding made available by the federal government to the states through the State 
Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), and the Urban Area Security Initiative 
(UASI) grant program. Because of these grant programs, many states took it upon 
themselves to either initiate a new state US&R program, or support their existing 
fledgling state US&R program. With the creation of FLUSAR program in 2002, Florida 
was one of those states. 
The problem is that FLUSAR has no strategic plan, no dedicated funding source 




address professionals, such as structural engineers and emergency physicians, who are 
not employees but are mission critical US&R task force members. This thesis seeks to 
answer the following questions: 
• Is FLUSAR an unnecessary duplication of services between the federal 
and state government? 
• If research indicates that FLUSAR is not a duplication of services between 
federal and state governments, how should it be structured for the future? 
• Which state agency should take the lead role in management and control 
of FLUSAR? 
• What weaknesses need to be addressed immediately to ensure the viability 
of FLUSAR for the future? 
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will evaluate the need of Florida to maintain its US&R system within 
the context of the principle of federalism, an evaluation of the present FEMA US&R 
system by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General, 
Congressional testimony on the status of the FEMA US&R system, the need to create a 
state US&R system in Florida after September 11, 2001, and the 2008 Operational and 
Readiness Evaluation of the FLUSAR system. 
The type of research is formative with a focus on the qualitative information 
gleaned from a extensive literature review, a survey of state USAR systems,  interviews 
with personnel who were involved with the establishment of FLUSAR, or have a role in 
other state’s USAR systems, and the author’s experience with the FLUSAR system with 
state  and local governments. It is the intent of this thesis is to evaluate the present 
capability of the US&R system within the state of Florida and to provide a description of 
where FLUSAR has been, where it is today and to recommend changes for the future in 
order to ensure the highest degree of performance and accountability to the citizens of 
Florida. 
The thesis will make recommendations for Florida regarding its responsibilities to 
its citizens for protection from man-made and natural disasters regarding US&R 
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response, including what critical areas need to be addressed immediately in order to 
sustain viability of the seven year-old system. The limitations on this research include a 
lack of previous research on the subject and a survey process that did not achieve any 
useful results due to lack of response from a state urban search and rescue Internet 
exchange. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An extensive literature review focused primarily on scholarly and industry-related 
literature relating to US&R, federalism, the status of the federal US&R system, the 
movement toward more state and local involvement in homeland security issues, 
regionalization, and critical issues that are affecting the viability and sustainability of 
FLUSAR. The literature was also surveyed for information regarding the suggested 
structure of the FLUSAR system (state vs. local control), strategic planning, and private 
sector/volunteer liability protection. Though there was not an abundance of information 
on many of the topics, signifying the need for additional research, enough literature was 
found to assist the author in developing conclusions. 
The analysis examined three primary issues. The first involved the strategic 
planning literature and sought to determine if strategic planning should be undertaken by 
FLUSAR to provide and outline a way forward. Additionally, due to the liability issues 
related to the use of professional engineers and medical physicians as an integral part of 
the US&R task forces, literature describing other disciplines that encounter the topic of 
volunteer liability was reviewed. Finally, because dwindling funds during tight economic 
times are causing a sustainability problem for FLUSAR, literature dealing with other 
forms of funding sources was reviewed. 
During the course of conducting the literature review, very little information 
specific to the strategic planning of a state’s US&R system was found. However, limited 
information on emergency service-related and homeland security strategic planning was 
available. Up until September 11, 2001, the primary provider of US&R in both Florida 
and the United States was the national US&R program administered by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency.  Before discussing the evolution of state US&R  
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programs and the need for Florida to take steps to improve its own US&R program, it is 
important to have an understanding of what US&R is and why it is important to a state’s 
homeland security strategy.   
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II. URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
ITS PURPOSE, EVOLUTION AND CHALLENGES FOR FEMA 
Urban search and rescue involves the location, rescue (extrication), and initial 
medical stabilization of victims trapped in confined spaces. Structural collapse is most 
often the cause of victims being trapped, but victims may also be trapped in 
transportation accidents, mines, and collapsed trenches. Urban search-and-rescue is 
considered a “multi-hazard” discipline, as it may be needed for a variety of emergencies 
or disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, storms and tornadoes, floods, 
dam failures, technological accidents, terrorist activities, and hazardous materials 
releases. The events may be slow in developing, as in the case of hurricanes, or sudden, 
as in the case of earthquakes (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2009, 
p. 1). The history of US&R can be said to go back to the days prior to the industrial 
revolution, when buildings began to reach multiple stories. When building collapses from 
various forms of disaster occurred, citizens and emergency responders had to dig through 
rubble by hand (Chiles, 2009).  
Today, US&R programs are loosely based on the collapsed structure rescue 
training developed in the United Kingdom during the blitz of World War II, and 
documented in the Home Office rescue manuals of that time (Chiles, 2009). According to 
Chiles, the first Luftwaffe raiders began attacking English air bases soon after the 
evacuation of Dunkirk. Attacks on London began in full force in early September 1940. 
An average of 200 bombers passed over England’s largest city every night through 
November 2, their bombs killing nearly 10,000 people. One night generated 150 collapse 
emergencies (Chiles). 
The Blitz delivered 25,000 tons of high explosives and innumerable small 
incendiaries onto London’s roofs and streets (Chiles, 2009). At the peak of the bombings, 
127,000 civil defense workers in London were toiling through the night, encountering 




written about the physics of destruction, the repair of broken pipes and electric lines, and 
managing panic (Chiles). Out of such chaos came timeless lessons in crisis management.  
Though not exposed to the same battlefield tests as the U.K. in WWII, the 
development of US&R in the United States has progressed slowly over the past three 
decades.  Through the 1970s, southern California emergency responders trained for 
earthquakes, and to this end, the further development of US&R can be traced to 
congressional enactment of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (later 
designated the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program [NEHRP]). 
According to Bea (2006) the primary mandate given by President Carter was for 
the designation of responsible agencies to establish and maintain a coordinated 
earthquake hazard reduction program, one primarily oriented toward earthquake 
prediction and mitigation and included organizing emergency services. 
In 1979, the Federal Emergency Management Agency was established. Congress 
then amended the formerly mentioned 1977 legislation to require FEMA to serve as lead 
agency for US&R.  In 1980, another significant change in the FEMA US&R program 
relevant to the history of US&R occurred; the requirement that the director of FEMA 
submit an “interagency coordination plan for earthquake hazard mitigation and response 
to Congress (Bea, 2006). 
In the early 1980s, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) organized the first US&R teams 
in recognition of the unmet federal need for heavy rescue capability during the 1985 
Mexico City earthquake. Two teams were selected: one from Miami-Dade, Florida, 
which had experience with light rescue and firefighter training in Latin America, and the 
other, Fairfax, Virginia, which, after a building collapse within Fairfax’s jurisdiction, had 
developed a collapsed-building response capability. The teams were selected for 
participation in this international response system (Trainor et al., 2007). 
In response to this mission, Fairfax County Fire & Rescue and Metro-Dade 
(today, Miami-Dade) County Fire Department created elite search-and-rescue (US&R) 
teams trained for rescue operations in collapsed buildings. Working with the USAID, 
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these teams provided vital search-and-rescue support for catastrophic earthquakes in 
Mexico City, the Philippines, and Armenia. These teams would eventually become the 
first members of the federal US&R system, In Miami, Florida Task Force 1 and in 
Fairfax, Virginia Task Force 1 (VA-TF 1), respectively. 
On a national level, the Loma Prieta earthquake and the devastation wrought by 
Hurricane Hugo earlier the same year brought about the movement within FEMA to 
begin a national US&R system. As a consequence of the Loma Prieta earthquake, 
Congress and FEMA revisited the scope of NEHRP. In doing so, the amendments to the 
original legislation expanded the role of federal response authority to include: develop 
and coordinate the execution of federal interagency plans to respond to an earthquake, 
with specific plans for each high-risk area that ensure the availability of adequate 
emergency medical resources, search and rescue personnel and equipment (Congressional 
Research Service, 2005). 
The plan to organize such rapid-response cadres on a national scale through the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency dates to 1990, spurred by frustration over poor 
responses to hurricanes in the southeastern United States and earthquakes in California, 
Armenia, and Mexico City. It was thought FEMA was simply an agency that sent 
someone with a checkbook to disasters to help pay for things that needed to be done. In 
light of the criticism and the recognized need for mobile teams of rescuers, engineers, 
hazardous materials specialists, canines and handlers, technical search specialists, and 
medical personnel, FEMA decided to start organizing the teams. 
In 1990, FEMA established the National Urban Search and Rescue Response 
System to have a capability that would provide lifesaving resources to victims entrapped 
in collapsed reinforced concrete structures across the nation. FEMA achieved the goal of 
a national US&R capability by cooperating with other federal, state, and local agencies, 
by integrating already established US&R teams from local agencies. 
However, according to the DHS Office of Inspector General (2006) FEMA never 
intended to have an in-house rescue capability of its own, and recognized that the best 
sources for urban search and rescue knowledge and skills resided at state and local 
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government. The Federal Emergency Management Agency established the National 
Urban Search and Rescue Response System as a framework for structuring local 
emergency services personnel into integrated disaster response task forces as a federal, 
state and local partnership. 
In 1991, the FEMA incorporated this concept into the Federal Response Plan 
(subsequently the National Response Plan, now National Response Framework), 
sponsoring 25 national urban search-and-rescue task forces (Greenberg, 2008). Events 
such as the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, the 
Northridge earthquake, the Kansas grain elevator explosion in 1998, and earthquakes in 
Turkey and Greece in 1999 underscored the need for highly skilled teams to rescue 
trapped victims. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 
September 11, 2001, thrust FEMA's urban search and rescue teams into the spotlight. 
Their important work captured the attention of the world, including the emergency 
services discipline, and brought with it accolades and thanks for the efforts of the highly 
trained responders. 
Today, there are 28 national task forces staffed and equipped to conduct round-
the-clock search-and-rescue operations following earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, 
hurricanes, aircraft accidents, hazardous materials spills and catastrophic structure 
collapses (Greenberg, 2008). These task forces, complete with the necessary tools and 
equipment, and required skills and techniques, can be deployed by the Department of 
Homeland Security, through FEMA, for the rescue of victims of structural collapse. 
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III. PROBLEMS WITH FEMA US&R SYSTEM FROM A STATE’S 
PERSPECTIVE 
There are problems with the FEMA system from a state perspective. As was 
addressed earlier, the federal US&R system is currently a component of DHS and 
administered by FEMA.  There are currently 28 task forces in the federal US&R system 
throughout the United States. These task forces are relied on by local and state 
governments to provide the resource of urban search and rescue in the event of a man-
made or natural disaster such as the Oklahoma City bombing, terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center, or the aftermath of tornadoes and hurricanes. 
According to Trainor et al. (2008), the creation of DHS after September 2001 
brings up conflict with whether the focus of emergency management would give priority 
to the adoption of a network approach focused on building connections between local, 
regional and state agencies, or the further strengthening and centralization of the federal 
system. Centralization usually attempts to adopt stronger federal policies and procedures 
in hopes of more uniform responses by the local, regional and state agencies (Trainor et 
al., p. 3). 
It has been suggested by Trainor et al. (2006) that the network approach is what 
reinvigorated FEMA under the direction of James Lee Witt in the 1980s. The network 
form emphasizes interaction among interdependent actors through which information and 
resources are exchanged and goals are formulated, with the formulation of collective 
goals being the key indicator of success of the system (Trainor et al., p. 1). Whether or 
not the federal US&R system remains sustainable, or is able to respond quickly enough to 
a Request for Assistance from a state, may play a major role in the decision making 
process of a state whether it will retain its existing US&R program or start its own. 
To this point, an audit conducted by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
pointed out some troubling information for these states that rely on the federal US&R 
task forces. According to OIG, Congress provided substantial increases to US&R funding 
with a system high allocation of $65 million in 2004 (Office of Inspector General [OIG], 
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2006, p. 1). This amount represented an increase of 500 percent over 2001; however, it 
fell to $30 million in 2005 (OIG, 2006).  Furthermore, according to the 2006 OIG report, 
due to funding and staffing constraints, FEMA did not monitor the task forces’ 
compliance with grant agreements or their achievement of US&R system objectives and 
standards for optimal task force response preparedness, and awarded equal grant amounts 
to each task force irrespective of individual task force readiness and financial needs, and 
did not clearly define program goals (OIG, 2006). 
Additionally, after a 2006 Operational Readiness Evaluation, of the seven task 
forces evaluated, six of the seven task forces fell below 50 percent of the FEMA 
established US&R system standards for operational readiness, or the ability to roster a 
full complement of completely trained, exercised and qualified personnel and disaster 
search canines, immediately ready to deploy (OIG, 2006, p. 3). During the course of the 
evaluations, the following deficiencies were documented: 
• Failure to complete FEMA required, full-scale operational readiness 
exercises. 
• Failure to complete FEMA required training, especially weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) training 
• Failure to complete medical and immunization requirements 
• Failure to complete update of task force member availability information 
• Failure to have the necessary complement of rostered canines, or the 
canines did not meet the required training, have necessary medical 
certifications or records of deployability, and were not available for 
exclusive task force use 
For Logistical Readiness of these seven task forces, five rated themselves below 
70 percent (OIG, 2006). FEMA designates Logistical Readiness as the availability of a 
complete equipment cache as well as other logistical resources needed to support 
immediate deployment. 
According to the DHS OIG report (2006), none of the task forces performed 
comprehensive physical inventories or maintained inventory records of cache equipment. 
All but one of the task forces were “significantly deficient in their historical record 
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keeping to show that required maintenance of major equipment items was performed on a 
regular basis, ensuring an ongoing state of readiness” (OIG, 2006, p. 5). Additionally, in 
investigating the disaster response to Hurricane Katrina, including FEMA’s US&R 
response, FEMA does have a well-designed system of response teams to respond to 
disaster events, including US&R. The problem lies in that these teams are under-funded, 
under-manned, under-equipped, under-trained, or non-existent. 
According to Congressional testimony given by Endrikat (2007) annual funding 
amounts to build and sustain the FEMA US&R program have varied widely since the 
program’s inception. The current annual cost to maintain a task force in a state of 
readiness has been estimated by FEMA to be approximately $1.7.million (Endrikat). At 
the current level of funding, each task force is faced with an approximate $1 million 
deficit (Endrikat). Because of this deficit, a significant portion of this deficit is usually 
made up by sponsoring agencies and participating agencies who absorb both “hard” costs 
(such as the payment of vehicle insurance, maintenance, and operating costs), and “soft” 
costs (such as the payment of salaries for members to maintain specialized rescue skills 
during training exercises) related to task force expenses. 
According to Endrikrat (2007), there are additional issues with the FEMA US&R 
system. The system has been functioning for many years without an advisory committee 
(historically comprised of members representing FEMA, Sponsoring Agency Chiefs, 
technical experts, labor officials, and emergency response professionals). In the past, the 
Advisory Committee has brought the diverse views of all stakeholders together and 
provided important guidance and a balanced viewpoint to FEMA with regard to the 
operation and administration of the US&R National Response System. 
Time and funding to develop working relationships with other federal agencies 
and the private sector to advance operational capabilities with the introduction of new 
technology is needed as is the maintenance and new technology upgrades of the original 
weapons of mass destruction equipment cache that was issued to each task force after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks. This equipment cache requires significant and stable funding 
that is currently not identified in the FEMA US&R budget. 
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In discussions with personnel that comprise some of the FEMA US&R task 
forces, Trainor et al. (2007) found a myriad of problems ranging from politics, to an 
apparent of lack of long term support from FEMA including funding and logistics, lack 
of program staff to adequately run the system, outdated procedures that cannot keep up 
with changing technology, and a general lack of oversight. They also cite sources that 
advocate a stand-alone federal US&R system is no longer needed, but what is needed is a 
national capability. This can be accomplished through the regional, or, Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) concept, especially in light of all the US&R 
capabilities that have been developed. Instead of having just 28 elite task forces, there 
would literally be hundreds of well-trained, well-qualified teams that can be used 
interchangeably anywhere.  
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IV. FEDERALISM AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN 
HOMELAND SECURITY—WHY FLORIDA NEEDS TO MAINTAIN 
ITS OWN US&R SYSTEM 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people. Tenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution 
The notion of federalism is based on striking a covenant to be so ruled. The 
covenant may manifest itself in many ways. The American experience, after suffering a 
confederal arrangement that failed under the Articles of Confederation, sought to find a 
balance that became the foundation of the American federal experience, arranged through 
the covenant found in the Constitution that arranged for a shared governance of the same 
people in the same territory. According to Dalrymple (2003), the founding fathers 
employed the phrase “federalism” for a system of government that divides power and 
responsibility among a central authority, states and a collection of more or less self-
governing local units. 
As noted in a speech made by then Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge to 
the National Association of Counties in 2004—also stated in Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-5, and the National Homeland Security Strategy—the concept of 
federalism is noted as the guiding principle in meeting the national demand for 
preparedness or the need for extensive coordination with state and local governments to 
arrive at the best possible levels of preparedness for the nation (Clovis, 2006, p. 2). 
Within the realm of federalism, the government structure of the United States is a 
unique one. According to Wright (2003), the history of federalism in the United States 
has been one of shifting patterns and of fluctuating balances between two contrasting 
themes. On one side of the relationship ledger are, “patterns of conflict, contentiousness 
and cleavages” (p. 11). Additionally, according to Clovis (2006), it can be said that there 
are two levels of government that have sovereignty over the same people (p. 3), in the 
case of this thesis there is the federal government, represented by the FEMA US&R  
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system, and state governments, represented by the state of Florida and FLUSAR, and it is 
the author’s belief the state needs to take a more active role in running the state US&R 
system. 
The attacks of 9/11 represented another event of potentially cataclysmic 
consequences for the nation. Such events typically tend to move the power-wielding 
pendulum more toward the federal government (Clovis, 2006). For instance, days after 
the event, Congress passed the controversial USA Patriot Act. In 2002, the Department of 
Homeland Security was formed through passage of the Homeland Security Act. 
Emergency funding was appropriated and allocated to all levels of government (p. 9). 
However, according to Kettl (2003), the September 11 attacks brought to light the 
important role local and state governments play in homeland security. It is the local 
emergency responders, along with state resources, that initially respond to emergencies. It 
is true that with the institution of the Department of Homeland Security, there is a large 
federal government footprint within the realm of emergency response to incidents of 
significant magnitude, and for the development of a homeland defense strategy, but the 
emergencies, no matter how large, are initially handled by local and, at times, state 
resources. 
State and local governments are a strong and effective part of this strategy. Kettl 
(2003) continues by saying in order to solve the problems existing in the 
federal/state/local homeland security system, the states’ role must be enhanced (p. 14). 
Ultimately, the nation’s homeland defense will be only as strong as the links between the 
national strategy and the ability of state and local governments to support it. Caurson et 
al. (2005) stated the events of September 11, 2001, created one of the most important 
public policy issues that federal, state, and local officials must address. The urgency of 
the homeland security mission demands that officials at all levels of government must 
work together like never before, as disasters do not confine themselves to jurisdictional 
boundaries (p. 291). 
Additionally, a National Governor’s Association (NGA) issue brief published in 
2005 called for a “comprehensive state-based strategy to prepare for, prevent, respond to 
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[emphasis added] and recover from terrorist attacks within their borders” (p. 147). The 
NGA brief further stated that the states see themselves as playing a key coordinating role 
between the federal government and their local governments. All federal resources, 
programs, and activities involving state and local governments must be coordinated 
through the nation’s governors and their appropriate agencies (Caruson & McManus, 
2007). In the case of US&R, it would be the state’s responsibility to coordinate the 
resources used for this function, using a state US&R system and supplementing it with a 
federal system. 
Scavo, Kearney and Kilroy (2008) stated there appears to be a resurgence in 
American federalism. State governments were at the forefront of domestic policy-making 
in 2007 and 2008. State officials were successful in securing relief from many 
burdensome federal regulations, some having to do with homeland security, and the 
National Guard. States, by virtue of being the main innovators in policy areas where the 
public was especially desirous of governmental action, were also more influential than in 
recent years in gaining flexibility in federal legislation. 
A strong system of intergovernmental relations is necessary for the 
implementation of a comprehensive homeland security policy. Due to the apparent lack 
of coordination, communication, responsiveness, and preparedness of government at all 
levels, a policy of state involvement and collaboration through regionalism offers a 
powerful tool for encouraging intergovernmental cooperation and for fulfilling the 
extensive mandates associated with homeland security. These points support the author’s 
belief that the state of Florida needs to take a more active role in the protection of its 
citizens and control FLUSAR. 
Eisinger (2006) stated even though national security is a fundamental 
responsibility of the national government, given the highly localized phenomenon of 
terrorism, there needs to be very close intergovernmental relations between all layers of 
government. Continuing, Congress often seems to be more interested in political 
considerations rather than security considerations, and the local governments in particular 
are made to bear heavy fiscal, administrative, and decision-making burdens that stretched 
and often exceeded their capabilities. In this definition, the author maintains elected 
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officials are more concerned with being re-elected than with enacting effective legislation 
that secures the homeland. It is because of this political consideration, as opposed to 
security considerations, that the state needs to be the homeland security bulwark for the 
local entities within its borders. 
Throughout the history of the United States, the theories of federalism that have 
evolved are dependent on patterns of conflict, contentiousness and cleavages. The ebb 
and flow of the differing categories of federalism started with the Civil War, the passage 
of the federal income tax law, the great depression, the post-World War II boom and the 
development of the Great Society. The sovereignty of the states seems to be dependent on 
the threat to the states or country at that time. In times of low threat, state sovereignty is 
strong. In times of crisis, the focus shifts to a stronger central government. A recent 
example is terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent Patriot Act of 2001, which 
constituted the opening chapter of an intense, extensive shift in the role and 
responsibilities of national government agencies (Clovis, 2006). 
Clovis (2008) also stated there is growing literature addressing the difficulties 
imposed on American federalism and intergovernmental relations related to homeland 
security national preparedness. Perhaps the most obvious consequence of the terrorist 
attack for state and local governments is the overall increase in their responsibilities, 
portending an emerging federalist revival. The federal government is now taking the 
position that all levels of government work cooperatively to shoulder the cost of 
homeland security. These attacks will likely accelerate the shift in fiscal federalism. 
Homeland security is a policy area in which national, state, and local governments 
have common goals such as preventing terrorism and reducing life loss and damage 
caused by natural disasters. US&R’s mission is to reduce life loss by effecting rescues in 
structures and elements that have been negatively influenced by either man-made or 
natural disasters. According to Roberts (2008), achieving these goals, however, requires 
rethinking how to coordinate action among the levels of government.  
Two watershed events seem to bookend the homeland debate regarding 
federalism. First was the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina in 
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2005. Roberts (2008) also stated both events seem to point toward a need, or at least a 
movement towards, centralization, as many people believed the emergency management 
system was too decentralized to be effective in a catastrophe. Centralization, such as the 
federalization of homeland security, has its virtues. The centralized power and division of 
labor found in a bureaucratized organization exhibits division of labor, standardized 
hierarchy and the use of technical competence in employment. The most basic concepts 
of centralized organizations show their effectiveness in areas where the work process is 
routine, repetitive and is a high degree of stability. 
According to (Scavo, Kearney & Kilroy, 2008), the intergovernmental dynamics 
of emergency and disaster response can be described as one of three different patterns: 1) 
A top-down approach whereby the national government takes control of the entire effort; 
2) A confusion approach where there is little or no coordination to the efforts of various 
governments to address a crisis; and 3) A shared-governance approach where the system 
works from the bottom up. The response bubbles up from the locals to the state and, 
ultimately, the national government. 
The first two are the antithesis of the dynamics of homeland security. A common 
criticism of a federalized response is the lack of adaptability to a rapidly changing 
situation. Routine tasks are programmable, but fluid events are unpredictable and demand 
adaptation and flexibility. Roberts (2008) found the problems faced in the individual 
states are not routine, in fact, they are diverse, not routine and do not conform to the idea 
of centralization. The disasters faced by one state are different from those that may affect 
another state. The local political climates also play into the equation. Additionally, there 
is the “principal agent” effect whereby a hierarchical form of government dictates the 
agent’s behavior through legislative mandates, contracts, performance measures, and 
reporting requirements. 
The argument to decentralize homeland security components from the federal 
government to the states is not a new concept. The old civil defense system advanced the 
“liberty argument” theory in that the state and local autonomy could not accommodate a 
purely national emergency management system (Roberts, 2008). However, the arguers 
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for decentralization point to the state as being a “laboratory of democracy” inasmuch as 
competition among the states improves performance and satisfies the diverse preferences 
of its constituents. 
Findings of Scavo et al. (2008) from a 2005 International City Managers 
Association survey showed the depiction of a top-down model where state and local 
governments are unable or unwilling to deal with a serious crisis, is not accurate. 
Additionally, the attempt in the 1990s to replace the local and state all-hazards response 
with a more centrally controlled federal response has serious drawbacks in both its use of 
the United States military and resistance from state and local officials. This was evident 
during the response to the post-Katrina Hurricane Wilma in Florida. A power struggle 
ensued between DHS and Florida Governor Jeb Bush. Governor Bush did not want a 
federalized response, while the military made plans to send the Fifth Army into Florida to 
assist with recovery operations. Florida’s National Guard balked at this approach and 
Governor Bush ultimately was named incident commander rather than a federal official. 
Based on the concept of federalism outlined above, it is the author’s belief that it 
is the state’s responsibility to provide the necessary coordination and management of 
resources to respond to an incident that exceeds local capacity. This would include 
US&R. The next section will outline the status, growth and advantages of state US&R 
programs. 
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V. STATE AND REGIONAL SYSTEMS—ANALYSIS OF STATE 
URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE 
Next, this thesis will look at the present state of state US&R systems across the 
United States. Over the past decade, accelerated after September 11, 2001, there has been 
a push by many states to have their own US&R systems to supplement the federal 
system. 
Twelve years ago, when the national US&R system was created, the threats were 
straightforward. The primary scenarios were centered on structural collapses from either 
a catastrophic earthquake on the west coast or hurricanes in the southeast. However, 
according to Cohen (2003), the national US&R response system has grown and adapted 
since its inception in 1989, but in the post-September 11, 2001, world, it faces even 
greater challenges. It is hard to imagine a time when virtually all of the teams were 
deployed to a single incident as they were to New York City on September 11, 2001, sans 
the few teams that were deployed to the Pentagon. 
Long before watershed, US&R events, such as the collapse of the World Trade 
Center Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, and the 1995 bombing of the Murrah 
building in Oklahoma City, there were local multidisciplinary response teams of 
volunteers and career responders that were training for mass-casualty incidents in urban 
environments. California had a nascent US&R program in the late 1970s in the larger, 
urban fire departments such as Los Angeles. According to Trainor et al. (2007), three 
important events facilitated the development of California’s US&R capability and 
ultimately provided much of the technology that drove the federal system. These were the 
establishment of the California Earthquake Task Force, Subcommittee on Search and 
Rescue, the passage of the Urban Heavy Rescue Act of 1988, and the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake in 1989. 
During the 1980s, several California fire departments trained specialty teams to 
respond to major floods and earthquake that occur within their state. This concept spread 
to other states that wanted to prepare for similar events. The idea was that these self-
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contained US&R teams would operate in collapsed buildings, locate and extricate 
victims, provide emergency medical care to the victims, assess and control utilities and 
hazardous materials at the site, and evaluate and stabilize damaged structures. 
According to Campbell (2004), though US&R is a vital resource for terrorism-
related scenarios and other types of disaster response, FEMA has no plans to add any 
more US&R task forces to its current system. The purpose of the FEMA US&R system is 
to assist state and local governments who are overwhelmed by a structural collapse 
incident. The Department of Homeland Security has provided funding to state and local 
governments since 2001 to develop regional task forces patterned after the federal task 
forces. 
As Jim Reilly, New Jersey’s US&R State Director stated, ultimately, the state’s 
governor is responsible for the protection of its citizens (Reilly, 2009). In true federalism 
form, states, regions and metropolitan areas are overcoming jurisdictional problems, 
funding obstacles and equipment shortages to develop their own US&R resources. In the 
realm of US&R, these resources may or may not be patterned after the FEMA US&R 
task forces. 
Some states, as found in Florida and Illinois, are developing a multi-tiered system 
with both technical rescue teams and US&R task forces of different typing networked 
throughout the state. Most are using federal grant funding to do so, but in some cases, the 
teams are using state and local resources. In both these state’s cases, a regional system 
was developed to ensure a tiered response based on incident need. 
According to Bates (2005), Rhode Island, California, Michigan, and Ohio are all 
in the process of either adding to the existing state US&R system, or starting one, as are 
Wisconsin, Georgia, and North and South Carolina. With an existing federal system of 28 
teams spread out across the United States, it is a fair question to ask, “Why?” It comes 
down to speed of response 
Events like the Oklahoma City bombing, the first World Trade Center attack, the 
September 11, 2001, attacks, and the slow response to Hurricane Katrina, brought clarity 
to the need to respond quickly and effectively to local disasters. It takes awhile to deploy 
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a FEMA US&R task force. According to testimony given to Congress by Endrikat 
(2007), FEMA task forces have up to six hours to assemble all members. This does not 
include the travel time. They also are only deployed to incidents reaching the level of a 
Stafford Act declaration, which many of the incidents do not. Though an incident may be 
a large local or state incident, it may not reach the magnitude of a national incident 
(Cleaveland, 2009).  
The local and state resources can put boots on the ground at the scene of a disaster 
or building collapse much quicker than a FEMA task force because they are either local 
or regional located. Another reason for the more rapid deployment of the state US&R 
systems is the deployment method. State and local teams can respond directly to the 
scene with minimal equipment while the bulk of the heavier equipment comes up behind 
them. While it may only take less than six hours for a state US&R task force to deploy to 
a scene, as stated in Bates (2005) the FEMA task forces can take 24–48 hours to get to a 
site of a “no notice” emergency, and then there is the time necessary to get the 
managerial component of the team positioned, the resources on-site and operating; all this 
takes additional time. 
Bates (2005) also points out another reason for a state or local government to 
develop a US&R program is the availability of the federal resources. Similar to what 
occurred in Florida on September 12, 2001, the state may find itself without US&R 
capability if the FEMA teams are activated for a disaster elsewhere in the country. In 
Florida’s case, both FEMA US&R task forces that reside in Florida (FL TF 1, Miami-
Dade, and FL TF 2, city of Miami) were deployed. The state had no US&R capability 
besides the heavy rescue capability of one or two local agencies. 
Torres (2006) discussed how the social bonds that emerged due to the localized 
familiarity helped create a seamless response process for the local and regional US&R 
resources that responded to the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (Torres, 2007). They 
had already established close working relationships, trust and shared many common 
elements such as terminology, equipment and communication. Many states have 
organized US&R resources, some new, and others that have been in place for years. New 
Jersey’s US&R task force was on the scene at ground zero within four hours of the 
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collapse of the World Trade Center in 2001. State US&R task forces are also part of a 
regional system that can either be contained within a certain portion of the state, or cross 
state lines, as part of a regional system with other states.  In California, with eight FEMA 
US&R task forces, already possesses formidable US&R resources, 
Marin County, California, will be the first solely “state” team as part of 
California’s US&R system, which presently is comprised of eight US&R task forces, but 
are also designated FEMA US&R task forces subject to “federalization” and deployment 
outside of California by FEMA. With the advent of the Marin County team as a state 
designated task force, California will now have a state task force to supplement the others 
and not be subject to this deployment. This will ensure California still has US&R 
capabilities even if the task forces that are FEMA task forces are deployed to an incident 
of national significance out of state.   
The state teams even have a resource network through the States Urban Search 
and Rescue Alliance (SUSAR) (Cleaveland, 2009). “Mick” Mayers of South Carolina TF 
1 and former director of South Carolina’s US&R Program recalled that SUSAR grew 
from a small group of concerned local and state representatives from different states who 
wished to coordinate knowledge, resources and information regarding state US&R teams, 
funding, training and other related information (personal communication, M. Mayers, 
August 18, 2009). SUSAR was developed in response to support issues particular to its 
state’s US&R programs (SUSAR, 2009). The state teams were not able to interface with 
the FEMA teams due to training, communication and other roadblocks. 
To solve the common challenges the state US&R teams were experiencing they 
decided to form a network in which they exchanged training opportunities, shared 
protocols and equipment cache lists, and dedicated themselves to working together to 
solve common challenges. They also sought to create an organization that could identify 
the gaps found between the FEMA system and the state and local teams and then to 
develop ways to fill the gaps to make a seamless, tiered system of local, state, and federal 
response. According to Cleaveland (2009), a main goal of SUSAR is to get every team 
credentialed to the same level as FEMA US&R task forces and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). 
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This seamless approach generated by the efforts of the state task forces that are 
part of SUSAR was evident during the response to the World Trade Center collapse on 
September 11, 2001. According to Endrikat (2007), state and local US&R assets 
interfaced into the emergency response. New Jersey TF1 deployed to New York City to 
the attack and collapse of the World Trade Center on September 11 and Puerto Rico TF-1 
deployed on September 13. Both task forces staged alongside FEMA task forces at the 
Javits Center Base of Operations. 
Neither team was, or is, part of the FEMA US&R National Response System, but 
both teams are modeled in a similar fashion to federal task forces in the areas of 
personnel rostering, equipment, and training. They technically did not come under the 
command and control of the FEMA US&R Incident Support Team (IST), but at the 
request of the Fire Department of New York as a request through the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact. The federal IST effectively coordinated their 
operations. 
SUSAR also seeks to be a networking resource for information that is pertinent to 
state US&R task forces, such as training requirements, funding sources and post-incident 
action reports. With the rapid deployment, reduced response time and ability to partner 
with other regions within their state, and region of the United States, and through state 
mutual-aid agreements such as the states’ Emergency Management Assistance Compact, 
state US&R task forces are an important part of a multi-tiered, rapid response to man-
made and natural disasters that may not meet the threshold of a FEMA US&R response 
(M. Mayers, personal communication, August 18, 2009). This will ensure that states still 
receive the specialized US&R response in incidents that may not reach a level for 
activation of the federal US&R system. 
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VI. THE URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE SYSTEM IN FLORIDA 
A. BIRTH OF A SYSTEM 
Though centered in New York City, Arlington, Virginia (the Pentagon), the 
events of September 11, 2001, affected every state in the United States, and Florida was 
no exception. Accordingly, on September 14, 2001, then Governor Jeb Bush formally 
directed state agencies to immediately complete a comprehensive strategic assessment of 
Florida’s capability to prevent, mitigate, and respond to these types of incidents. 
Governor Bush further directed that the assessment examine the capabilities regarding 
training programs, equipment, and execution protocols, focusing particularly on 
preventing an event and mitigating the aftermath related to an event of significant 
consequence occurring in the state. 
Using the existing networks of law enforcement, firefighters, emergency medical 
services, emergency management and selected private sector partners, these workgroups 
collected information about Florida’s existing capabilities and capacities. The compiled 
information provided valuable insight into the status of Florida’s domestic security 
preparedness and exposed a significant weakness in the state’s ability to respond to an 
incident that required urban search and rescue. 
According to Quinn (personal communication, May 30, 2009) Governor Jeb Bush 
was apprised that FL TF-1 and TF-2, both Type I FEMA US&R task forces, were 
deployed by FEMA to New York City to search the rubble of the World Trade Center. 
With the exception of an “unofficial” local resource US&R team (what is today FL TF 
3—Hillsborough County Fire Rescue) and other local resource heavy rescue capabilities, 
the entire state of Florida was left without US&R capability. This was compounded 
because all but three (all located in California) of the 28 FEMA US&R task forces were 
deployed to either New York City or Arlington, Virginia. According to Napoli (personal 
communication, September 1, 2009), Governor Bush was very direct in stating this 
vacancy shall not be allowed to happen again. Thus was the catalyst for the start of 
FLUSAR. 
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According to Casey (personal communication, June 20, 2009), Governor Bush 
made it very clear to all state personnel that in going forward and establishing state 
homeland security policy and strategy, the state was ultimately responsible for the 
emergency management function and protection of its citizens, not the federal 
government. He stated it would be unacceptable for the state to abdicate its responsibility 
to protect its citizens and rely solely on the federal government in emergency 
management situations. 
It was also the governor’s intent to partner with representative state associations 
such as the Florida Fire Chiefs Association (FFCA), Florida Association of Search and 
Rescue (FASAR), Florida Association of Hazardous Materials Responders (FLAHR), but 
that the final authority and responsibility for state and local fire resource use during 
incidents that affected the state was the responsibility of the State Fire Marshal (personal 
communications). 
Additionally, according to Florida’s Comprehensive Emergency Management 
Plan (2004), the Director of State Fire Marshal (SFM) Emergency Coordinating Officer 
(ECO) is responsible for Emergency Support Function (ESF) 9, Search and Rescue. This 
includes urban search and rescue. US&R involves the location, rescue (extrication), and 
initial medical stabilization of victims trapped in confined spaces where technical 
expertise and equipment are required beyond the normal fire service response. 
B. EVOLUTION 
According to the author’s interviews with Quinn (personal communication, May 
30, 2009), Napoli (personal communication, September 1, 2009), and Casey (personal 
communication, June 20, 2009), through the course of much interagency collaboration 
and cooperation, the state of Florida developed a model State Domestic Security Strategy 
based on a regional concept. The regional concept was based on the Regional Domestic 
Security Task Forces with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement as the lead, and 
other disciplines (health, emergency management, law enforcement, fire, and education) 
involved in each region at the local level, and involved at the state level through the state 
agencies. 
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Under the leadership of the Division of State Fire Marshal, and in conjunction 
with FFCA and FASAR, a comprehensive state US&R program was developed with the 
responsibility of equipping and training the task forces being assigned to the SFM and 
FASAR and deployments being assigned to SFM in conjunction with FFCA under the 
auspices of the renown State Emergency Response Plan (SERP) and FASAR as technical 
partners.  It was a true partnership between state and local entities. 
Eventually, nine US&R task forces were equipped and trained, with three being 
the resource rich Type I Task Forces (210 personnel), three as Type II Task Forces (70 
personnel) and three as Type III resources (approximately 33 personnel) (personal 
communication, D.A Casey, June 20, 2009; R. Napoli, September 1, 2009; T. Quinn, 
May 30, 2009). These task forces were distributed throughout the state and hosted by 
either one large metropolitan fire department, or as a conglomeration of smaller local fire 
departments that pooled resources. 
Another component of FLUSAR was the creation of what was originally known 
as Type IV US&R Teams, but later evolved to Type II Technical Rescue Teams, which 
better fit their charge as a “first out” local resource that can respond to light building 
collapses and conduct initial rescue operations and stabilization until the arrival of a 
US&R task force, if needed. Originally, 53 of these local resources were equipped, 
trained, and set up throughout various regions of the state (personal communication, D.A 
Casey, June 20, 2009; R. Napoli, September 1, 2009; T. Quinn, May 30, 2009). This 
multi-tiered system was the first of its kind and is now copied by many other state 
systems (personal communication, M. Mayers, August 18, 2009). 
The FLUSAR system developed through the early 2000’s to its present structure 
of nine task forces and more than 40 Type II Technical Rescue Teams. These teams and 
task forces were used extensively through the active hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005, 
and other varied incidents (tornadoes, building collapse) that have occurred throughout 
the state. However, as federal grant sustainment funding has dwindled, attrition has 
occurred, the newness of the system has worn off, and the economy has soured, it appears 
the system may be in need of a new direction. There are the three major issues that affect 
the viability of the FLUSAR system. 
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C. FUTURE DIRECTION 
During August, 2008, the state of Florida Urban Search and Rescue System 
underwent its first Operational Readiness Evaluation, which was conducted by an 
evaluator with experience evaluating the FEMA US&R task forces. The purpose of the 
ORE was two-fold: 1) To evaluate the Operational Capabilities of the FLUSAR system, 
and; 2) To ensure fiscal accountability for the reimbursed Department of Homeland 
Security Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) funds distributed to Florida’s nine 
urban search and rescue task forces and the 53 light technical rescue teams (personal 
communication, D.A Casey, June 20, 2009; R. Napoli, September 1, 2009; T. Quinn, 
May 30, 2009). 
Florida was the first state in the United States to undergo this critical self-analysis 
of capabilities and financial stewardship. As indicated by the high overall scores, the 
FLUSAR system exhibited many strengths, including a high degree of training for the 
participants, an extensive equipment cache and good fiscal accountability for the short 
period of time FLUSAR had been organized. The FLUSAR response system is based 
upon providing a localized, rapid, coordinated response to disasters in urbanized 
environments. Special emphasis is placed on the capability to locate and extricate victims 
trapped in collapsed buildings, from light residential construction to heavily reinforced 
concrete structures.  Since its inception, FLUSAR has proven its value repeatedly, with 
numerous responses to the hurricanes of 2004 and 2005 (including interstate response to 
Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina), and to the Central Florida tornadoes of 2007. 
However, the ORE also outlined several weaknesses. Among these, FLUSAR 
has: 
• No dedicated funding source to continue its mission, 
• No central controlling authority, 
• A policy to address professionals such as structural engineers and 
emergency physicians who, though not employees, are still critical us&r 
task force members, and 
• Lacks a strategic plan for its future. 
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During the course of the interviews for this thesis, according to (personal 
communication, D.A Casey, June 20, 2009; R. Napoli, September 1, 2009; T. Quinn, 
May 30, 2009), these weaknesses can be summarized as problems in coordination and 
management, future planning and financial stability and are significant because they 
potentially limit further successes for the FLUSAR system and potentially put citizens of 
the state at risk. 
The State Fire Marshal (SFM), Florida Association of Search and Rescue, Florida 
Fire Chief’s Association, the Domestic Security Oversight Council, and the State 
Working Group on Domestic Security all have been instrumental in the process of 
developing this comprehensive statewide US&R system as well as with standardized 
training programs and equipment lists. The SFM has acted as the “pass-through” agency 
ensuring appropriate use of over 50 million dollars of federal Homeland Security Grant 
Program funds to establish, equip and train the FLUSAR system.  
The present composition of FLUSAR is made up entirely of local fire department 
resources. Several of the task forces and TRTs are actually comprised of multiple local 
departments. These local entities use a combination of local and federal funds that are 
reimbursed to them by the SFM after completion of approved equipment purchases 
and/or training. No state funds are appropriated by the state legislature for this purpose. 
The participating agencies maintain the capability of rapidly deploying resources 
based on the reported magnitude of the incident. The system is based on a tiered response 
that ensures the proper response of the closest appropriate resources for the incident, and 
is managed through the State Emergency Response Plan, a document that has been 
developed by the Florida Fire Chief’s Association (2008) and is operated in conjunction 
with ESF 9 and FASAR. The present FLUSAR system is very comprehensive and the 
present structure requires a high degree of collaboration between SFM, FASAR, and the 
SERP plan managed by FFCA. 
It is a problem that though SFM is responsible for ESF 9, the state has very few 
assets at its disposal for US&R duties and relies on the local fire departments to provide 
the resources for the US&R task forces. The state also relies on only one part-time 
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contract employee for program coordination. Additionally, there is no strategic plan, or 
long-range plan for the system. Several nominal attempts have been made to complete 
such a plan with no success due to the voluntary nature of FASAR personnel and lack of 
dedicated funding mechanism. 
FASAR’s members are the task force leaders and other integral personnel of the 
system; however, participation in that organization is purely voluntary. They are 
employees of the local fire departments that comprise US&R task forces, but they are not 
employees of the state. The work they do for FASAR is purely voluntary. Between the 
one part-time program coordinator and the voluntary status of FASAR personnel, work 
such as strategic planning and other benchmarking languishes. Additionally, because the 
members of FASAR represent their individual task force instead of the state, there is the 
potential for “turf” protection and prohibits a “system-wide” view. 
Funding is based on either local resources or a portion of the state’s Homeland 
Security Grant Program award; little or no additional state funding is available for the 
program. The only existing document that remotely holds the local departments 
accountable for response, or non-response is the current sub-grant agreements SFM uses 
to allow for the HSGP “pass-through” funds reimbursements. 
Other than the Emergency Coordinator Officer for ESF 9, and the few SFM 
personnel maintaining the records for activations, none of the organizations involved in 
FLUSAR activations and response (FASAR and FFCA) are state employees and 
therefore cannot legally be held accountable for their actions to the governor, who is 
ultimately responsible to the citizens of the state. Lastly, there is no existing legislation to 
protect civilian members of task forces (physicians, structural engineers) from liability 
during actions when conducting task force specific functions. 
These personnel, who are not employees of the local resources that comprise the 
US&R task forces, are individual private-sector professionals who volunteer their time 
and professional expertise in FLUSAR because they understand the importance. 
However, they are also exposing themselves to tremendous personal and professional 
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liability without any provision of liability protection from the state. Why it is important to 
address these weaknesses will now be addressed individually. 
1. Strategic Plan 
With the signing of the Homeland Security Preparedness Directive (HSPD–8) on 
December 17, 2003, came the requirement that all federal preparedness assistance be 
predicated on the adoption of statewide comprehensive all hazards preparedness 
strategies (White House, 2006). According to Chen (2006), the coordinated homeland 
security preparedness efforts are guided by comprehensive strategic plans that are 
developed through enterprise-wide strategic planning. Urban search and rescue is 
specifically addressed in the Florida Domestic Security Strategy (2007), Goal 4 
(Response), Objective 4.14 (Urban Search and Rescue), to respond in an immediate, 
effective, and coordinated manner focused on the victims of the attack. 
Coordinated homeland security preparedness efforts for all hazards, including 
response to incidents that would require rescue from building collapses, floods and other 
US&R related tasks are also guided by these comprehensive strategic plans. In 2005, the 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Domestic Preparedness issued the state and 
Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy Guidance on Aligning Strategy with the 
National Preparedness Goal (Chen, 2006). This guidance reaffirmed the specific purpose 
of homeland security strategies, of which one was to provide a strategic plan for the use 
of federal, state, local and private resources within the state. However, the Florida Urban 
Search and Rescue System does not have a strategic plan. 
Strategic planning is vital to determine where an organization is going in the next 
year or more, how it is going to get there and how to know if it got there or not. Strategic 
planning is a process that helps organizations be responsive and proactive to the 
instability of the fire departments operating environments, both political and financial. 
According to Sturgis (2007), a strategic plan provides direction in decision 
making and action in order to better shape and guide what an organization is and does (p. 
91). Ludwig (2007a) wrote, “Just like a road map, strategic planning allows an 
organization to mark a starting point for a specific goal and establish a mechanism for 
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tracking progress (p. 24). Furthermore, Ludwig (2007b) also wrote, “Besides the obvious 
benefit of clearly defining the purpose of the organization and establish realistic goals 
and objectives, these goals and objectives are communicated to everyone within the 
system (p. 26). 
Additionally, strategic planning allows an organization to make the best use of 
resources by focusing them on key priorities, allows a starting point for a specific goal 
and brings into focus what the organization wants to accomplish. This is a priority in a 
system such as FLUSAR, which started from scratch and after an infusion of over 30 
million dollars since September 11, 2001, is lacking direction of what is wanted for its 
future. 
Wallace (2006a) discussed how strategic plans can be conducted either over a 
year-to-year process, or multi-year undertakings, and some strategic goals can be an 
ongoing process. Strategic plans are not based on time horizons, but designed to provide 
guidance and direction to operational plans (p. 93). These operational plans will outline 
the methods of operations, staffing, training, funding sources and accountability for the 
USAR task forces; the mission. According to Sturgis (2007), creating a mission statement 
in the strategic planning process will highlight organizational purpose and will let 
everyone know whom the agency is serving. This is vital because currently FLUSAR 
does not have a mission statement. It is known that FLUSAR serves the citizens of the 
state, but it is not written anywhere and is subject to many differing opinions and ideas. 
As reported by Trainor et al. (2007), in the absence of strategic thinking and strategy 
setting for the program, other groups will influence the development of the US&R system 
in unexpected ways, creating new versions of what it is supposed to be doing. 
It is clear from a review of this literature that the strategic planning process would 
be a valuable tool for the FLUSAR system in determining its future structure. Though the 
literature is not specific to US&R teams conducting strategic planning to set a course for 
their future, the principles discussed in the strategic planning literature that were 
reviewed outline courses of action that could be applied to US&R task forces to prepare 
for the future. 
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2. Volunteer Liability—Structural Specialists and Medical Team 
Managers 
As was mentioned earlier, there are two US&R task force positions that are 
generally comprised of civilian specialists. These specialists serve in the very specific 
and important functions of structural specialist (engineer) and medical team manager 
(emergency physician). Specific literature directly correlating to US&R engineers and 
physicians could not be found, though there were several items that dealt with volunteer 
liability in disaster response. 
The issue of what to do about volunteer liability, especially regarding these 
important positions, is of critical importance for the future of Florida’s US&R system and 
a priority issue to be addressed by the State Fire Marshal as no other homeland security 
or emergency management discipline has the ability to provide this service. The present 
composition of FLUSAR is primarily made up of local fire department resources and 
other multi-discipline resources located throughout the state. 
These agencies’ government employee members are subject to present state law 
that protects the government entity, and its employees, from legal liability for actions 
taken within the performance of their duty. Multi-discipline volunteers from the private 
sector in the capacity of structural specialists (engineers) and medical team manager 
(emergency physicians) also serve the task forces providing a very important role that 
without which the task forces would not exist. 
The structural specialists (StS) are a private sector based, licensed professional 
engineer or engineering intern who is not employed by either the state or fire service 
industry. The typical medical team manager (MTM) is an emergency medical physician 
specially trained in trauma and crush injuries. These physicians may serve as medical 
directors for emergency response agencies or emergency room/trauma center physicians. 
The problem is, because the StS and MTM positions, though both critical for the 
deployment of US&R task forces, are not government employees, but are private sector 
volunteer members of the task force, and therefore not afforded any type of immunity 
when performing task force work. 
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According to the Center for Law and the Public’s Health (2004), one of the most 
important legal areas for emergency preparedness concerns issues of legal liability for 
public and private sector agencies and their workers/volunteers regarding emergency 
responses. These private sector citizen members who fill the important responsibilities of 
structural specialist and medical team manager are subject to legal liability that may 
jeopardize their professional licensure. The typical StS is a licensed professional engineer 
(PE) or engineering Intern (EI) who is not employed by either the state or local fire 
service. Therefore, the professional serving as an StS is not afforded any type of legal 
protection when performing those tasks. They are exposed to civil litigation and their 
licensure is at risk.  
The structural engineers are comprised of professional structural engineers who 
volunteer their time to be a part of a US&R task force. According to Florida Task Force 
4’s Web site (2009), its main responsibilities are: 
• Assessing the immediate structural condition of the affected area of task 
force operations, which includes identifying structure types and specific 
damage and structural hazards. 
• Recommending the appropriate type and amount of structural hazard 
mitigation in order to minimize risks on site to task force personnel. 
• Monitoring assigned structures for condition changes while rescue and 
recovery operations are proceeding. 
• Assuming an active role in implementing approved structural hazard 
mitigation as a designer, inspector, and possibly a supervisor. 
• Coordinating and communicating the structural related hazard mitigation 
with the rescue team manager. 
The medical specialists (emergency medical physicians) are comprised of 
professional emergency medical physicians with special training in traumatic injury 
treatment who volunteer their time to respond to disasters as a component of a US&R 
task force. According to Florida Task Force 4’s Web site (2009), its main responsibilities 
are: 
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• The general health considerations and delivery of medical care to all task 
force personnel, victims, and search dogs, while under the supervision of 
the medical team manager, during disaster events. 
• Implementing the medical action plans specified by the medical team 
manager. 
Structural collapse is most often the cause of victims being trapped, but victims 
may also be trapped in transportation accidents, mines, and collapsed trenches. US&R is 
considered a "multi-hazard" discipline, as it may be needed for a variety of emergencies 
or disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, storms and tornadoes, floods, dam 
failures, technological accidents, or terrorist activities. 
All states offer some degree of qualified immunity from liability to specific 
persons or entities under certain circumstances. Immunity can arise from several legal 
sources including (1) judicial or common law; (2) federal and state Tort Claims Act; (3) 
volunteer protection statutes; and (4) so-called “Good Samaritan” provisions. 
Additionally, according to Congressional Research Service (CRS), the federal and state 
governments, through public health statutes, general emergency statutes and mutual-aid 
agreements, generally enjoy sovereign immunity from suit, and this immunity extends to 
individual government employees and usually provides some form of immunity for 
responders (2005, p. 7). While the federal government and many state governments have 
waived this immunity with the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act and similar state 
tort claim acts, these acts generally preclude suits in tort against individual government 
employees. 
State governors generally have the authority under emergency statutes and powers 
to declare volunteers temporary state employees. Every state has a regimen for declaring 
a state of emergency, and such a declaration can explicitly trigger liability protections or 
allow the governor to do so. During Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi’s emergency 
management statute, for example, provided civil liability protection to state government 
employees and agents during a declared emergency. Alabama protects a much broader 
group of “emergency management workers,” which includes all of those working for an 
entity responding to Alabama’s call for assistance during a declared emergency. The 
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declaration of such an emergency triggers special protections for medical personnel, often 
including liability protection for volunteer health professionals. 
California, for example, has addressed this issue regarding worker’s 
compensation for non-emergency volunteers who pre-register as a disaster service worker 
(DSW). The Emergency Services Act provides DSW volunteers with limited immunity 
from liability while providing disaster service.  In California and New Jersey (two other 
states that have state US&R task forces), when a task force is activated by the state, the 
structures specialist (StS) becomes a state employee for the term of activation. 
According to the (Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2005) nearly every 
state has enacted some sort of Volunteer Protection Act, the protections of which vary. 
The federal Volunteer Protection Act (VPA) provides limited protection. Immunity from 
liability protects the political subdivision or political entity, and the DSW volunteer in 
any civil litigation resulting from acts of good faith made by the political subdivision or 
political entity, or the DSW volunteer, while providing disaster service (e.g., damage or 
destruction of property; injury or death of an individual). 
Immunity from liability does not apply in cases of willful intent, unreasonable 
acts beyond the scope of DSW training, or if a criminal act is committed. It is also 
unclear from this legislation whether DSW with professional designations (such as 
engineers and physicians) would be covered. The Disaster Relief Volunteer Protection 
Act of 2006, a federal law, was to provide liability protection for individuals who 
volunteer to assist victims of national disasters for any injury (including personal injury, 
property damage or loss, and death) caused by an act or omission in connection with 
disaster relief services provided or facilitated by the volunteer (CRS, 2005). 
It also would have extended such liability protection to: (1) the volunteer's 
employer, host, or enabling person, entity, or organization; (2) nonprofit organizations 
providing or facilitating disaster relief services; or (3) governmental or intergovernmental 
entity and would prohibit the award of punitive damages in any civil action against a 
disaster relief volunteer or governmental or intergovernmental entity. This act, however, 
did not become law. 
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Without structural technical specialists (engineers) and medical team managers 
(physicians) there can be no US&R task force. Without US&R task forces, another 
emergency management or homeland security discipline would have to take up the 
responsibility for performing this role. None of the other disciplines are prepared, trained 
or equipped to take on this responsibility. Therefore, it is important that the necessary 
legislation be drafted, submitted and approved during the next legislative session 
commencing January 2010. By enacting protective legislation, the state of Florida will 
ensure keeping intact the outstanding US&R program it has dedicated significant 
resources to establish. There is no known downside to implementing such legislation 
other than the potential for other legislation to be tacked onto the original bill. 
The FLUSAR response system is based upon providing a coordinated response to 
disasters in urbanized environments. Special emphasis is placed on the capability to 
locate and extricate victims trapped in collapsed buildings, from light residential 
construction to heavy reinforced concrete structures. In order to do this effectively, a 
US&R task force needs a core group of volunteer professionals in the capacity of 
structural engineers and medical physicians. The US&R task forces utilize professional 
engineers as structures specialists to assess the structural conditions including identifying 
structure types and specific damages and structure hazards. This also includes 
recommending the appropriate type and amount of structural hazard mitigation in order to 
minimize risks to task force personnel. The model for this is the federal US&R system 
incorporated into FEMA. 
The US&R task forces utilize the emergency medical physicians for all medical 
aspects of their team members and victims that may be rescued by the task force. These 
members are often private sector emergency medical physicians who also are not offered 
the same protections against liability and risk legal action that can affect their 
professional designation(s) and licensure. As this becomes more of an issue, the existing 
personnel who fulfill these very important duties may opt out of belonging and 
responding with a task force. Addressing this weakness immediately with legislation will 
help ensure the continued highest degree of US&R performance and accountability to the 
citizens of Florida. 
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The area that most closely matched was in the realm of volunteer health 
professionals. There is a series of federal and state legislation that addresses this topic. 
The first of which falls under the rubric of “sovereign immunity.” According to the 
Congressional Research Service (2005), the federal and state governments generally 
enjoy sovereign immunity from suit and this immunity extends to individual government 
employees. One of the easiest ways to shield these important task force volunteers from 
individual civil liability, therefore, is to make them temporary non-paid employees of the 
federal government or a state government. 
State governors generally have the authority under their emergency powers to 
declare these volunteers to be temporary state employees. Additionally, every state has a 
regime for declaring a state of emergency, and such a declaration can explicitly trigger 
liability protections or allow the governor to do so. For example, the Congressional 
Research Service (2005) also reported during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Louisiana 
Governor Kathleen Blanco, pursuant to her public health emergency powers, issued an 
executive order temporarily suspending all licensure requirements for medical volunteers 
(so long as they are licensed in other states) and declaring such volunteers to be state 
employees shielded from civil liability. 
Finally, nearly every state has enacted some sort of volunteer protection act, the 
protections of which vary. According to the Congressional Research Service (2005), the 
VPA protects from liability government and non-profit volunteers where: (1) the 
volunteers were acting within the scope of their responsibilities; (2) the volunteers were 
licensed or certified, if licensure or certification was required; (3) the harm was not the 
result of willful action, grossly negligent behavior, etc.; and (4) the harm was not caused 
by a volunteer’s operation of a vehicle. The VPA does not affect the liability of the non-
profit or governmental entity for the action of its volunteers, nor does it affect such an 
entity’s ability to file any action against a volunteer. 
The status of these professional volunteers is a very important topic for the 
FLUSAR system as without professional structural engineers to determine the safety of 
collapsed structures for entry by US&R personnel, and without physicians for treatment 
of entrapped victims, or injured rescuers, FLUSAR would not be able to exist. At the 
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time this literature review was conducted, the only substantive literature was the 
Congressional Research Service (2005) report. Further research must be conducted to 
find additional writings on legislation that covers the issue of volunteer liability in the 
context of US&R task force participation for non-emergency service workers such as 
structural engineers and medical physicians. 
3. Funding 
A search of the literature yielded no specific information regarding the status of 
funding for state US&R systems such as FLUSAR; however, there was some limited 
literature pertaining to the funding of the federal US&R system that can be used as a 
guide for state systems such as FLUSAR. In the federal US&R system, funding for task 
force activities related to disaster response is provided through the Disaster Relief Fund 
administered by FEMA. 
In 2001, prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which thereafter every one of the 28 
federal US&R task forces responded to the World Trade Center, the federal US&R 
system was allocated $10 million (OIG, 2006). Subsequently, that amount climbed to $43 
million in 2002, $61 million in 2003, and $65 million in 2004 (OIG, 2006). However, in 
2005, the federal US&R system was only allocated $30 million (OIG, 2006). According 
to the Congressional Research Service (2005), the local units of government that 
comprise the federal task forces serve as the primary source of funds for the task forces, 
and the federal government provides funding for costs incurred while the task forces are 
activated for deployment. States provide little, if any, financial support. The federal 
system uses a cooperative agreement to continue development and maintenance of the 
federal US&R system. The agreement provides the mechanism to provide federal funding 
to the local resources that comprise these task forces. 
As stated in FEMA (2005), the cooperative agreement is a memorandum of 
agreement which outlines the funding which local resources that comprise the federal 
US&R task force will receive, and in return outlines the requirements the task force must 
meet as it pertains to program management, records management, training, deployment 
requirements and evaluative standards. However, funding the federal US&R system 
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proves to be challenging and wrought with inconsistencies and problems. According to 
the literature, FEMA has not performed financial assessments of costs required to achieve 
overall federal US&R system goals or detailed analyses of the task forces’ funding needs 
to achieve grant agreement goals. Additionally, according to DHS (2006), it is apparent 
that FEMA has not made the expectations for goals and costs to achieve the goals within 
the FEMA US&R task forces. 
Also mentioned in DHS (2006), FEMA allocated approximately 40 percent of the 
federal US&R system’s funds to grants and awarded equal amounts to each task force but 
ignored the needs and readiness of each individual task force by equally distributing these 
grants to all of the federal US&R task forces without regard to the different size 
equipment caches of each task force. Additionally, other financial requirements were 
often placed on the federal US&R task forces without regard to individual task force 
training needs. 
It is an understatement that without adequate funding, the FLUSAR system will 
not be able to operate. The majority of the costs related to operating a state US&R task 
force is presently borne by the local entity (entities) that comprise the task forces. Federal 
grant funding through the State Homeland Security Grant Program assist with some of 
the sustainment costs and training costs associated with operating a task force. In order 
for the FLUSAR system to thrive, or even survive, the state of Florida will have to 
supplement funding the FLUSAR system as well. Without state funding, FLUSAR will 
cease to exist which will reduce Florida’s state and local government’s ability to respond 
to incidents that require US&R. 
In the author’s experience with FLUSAR, this occurrence came very close to 
happening. When there was a question of whether the DHS would continue one of its 
reimbursement policies for the training of task force members causing a potential budget 
liability for the local agencies that comprise these resources, several of the FLUSAR task 
force leaders said their individual agencies would no longer be able to be part of the 




continue receiving training funds reimbursements through the grant program.  Without 
guaranteed state funding to supplement the local funding, the future of the program is in 
serious doubt. 
The recent Operational Readiness Evaluations, published federal documents, and 
the experience of working with the existing system since 2001, has shown that the state 
of Florida has a very good US&R system, but needs to prepare for the future by taking 
the necessary steps to protect the volunteers who respond with the US&R task forces. 
In light of the fact hurricane season lasts nearly half of the year and the most 
frequent use of the US&R task forces in Florida has been hurricane deployments, the 
political implications are clear. Failure of the state US&R system and the loss of the 
accompanying funds that have been spent to create the system will result in a political 
backlash assuring many of those who decide not to take action to be voted out of office 
during the next election. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS/IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
The research included in this thesis sought to answer the following questions: 
1. Is FLUSAR an unnecessary duplication of services between the federal 
and state government? 
2. If research indicates that FLUSAR is not a duplication of services between 
federal and state governments, how should it be structured for the future? 
3. Which state agency should take the lead role in management of FLUSAR? 
4. What weaknesses need to be addressed immediately to ensure the viability 
of FLUSAR for the future? 
It can be argued that from a cost/benefit perspective it is necessary to have state 
US&R resources in a state that has FEMA US&R resources within its state or regional 
border, similar to Florida, which houses two FEMA US&R task forces. However, as the 
research indicated, disasters start as a local event and, if significant enough or if 
specialized resources are required, will process through state then federal resources. If 
Florida did not have its own US&R system at the state level, the chances of Florida’s two 
FEMA US&R task forces being deployed out of the state and leaving the state devoid of 
similar resources may be minimal relative to the cost of maintaining the system. 
However, as was stated earlier in this paper, Florida’s US&R system provides for a tiered 
response with over 40 Light Technical Rescue Teams spread throughout the state, in 
conjunction with the nine US&R task forces (personal communication, D.A Casey, June 
20, 2009; R. Napoli, September 1, 2009; T. Quinn, May 30, 2009). 
The system is designed with the local community as the first level for an 
immediate response and stabilization of the incident, including the capability to seek 
further assistance locally, regionally, state level and nationally. As the research indicated, 
speed in getting specialized resources to the incident location is paramount to a 




(over 10 state US&R task force deployments during the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons 
alone), tornadoes and floods, the timeliness of delivery of specialized resources from the 
state system is critical. 
All emergencies are local; and if they escalate, they will become the responsibility 
of the state. The most effective response is the one that starts at the local level and grows 
with support from the surrounding communities, the state, and then the federal 
government, if necessary. Research presented indicates that it is both expected and 
imperative that states take more of a leadership role in homeland security. 
In light of this, and the research presented herein about the delay in a FEMA 
US&R response, the author believes there is not a duplication of services between FEMA 
and FLUSAR and the concept of collaborative federalism drives the state to assume the 
requisite leadership role; assuming the responsibility for coordination, management and 
administration of the program that is comprised of local resources.  Since it has been 
established that FLUSAR does not represent a conflict of interest, the author is also 
recommending that a dedicated state US&R system administered, coordinated and funded 
at the state level be instituted which segues into the third question. 
The third question dealt with identifying the correct state agency to be responsible 
for the coordinating and administering the FLUSAR system. Since the overwhelming 
majority of resources that comprise a US&R task force are fire resources, it is fitting that 
the Florida Department of Financial Services, Division of State Fire Marshal (SFM) be 
the state agency responsible for this function. Not only is the SFM’s role in this respect 
outlined in both state statute (F.S. 633) and Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C 69A), 
but as mentioned earlier, the SFM disaster responsibility is documented in the state of 
Florida Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, (Florida Department of 
Emergency Management, 2004, pp. 35, 70). Emergency Support Function 9, Search and 
Rescue, and the Florida Domestic Security Strategy Goal 4, Respond, Objective 4.14, 
Search and Rescue (2004) both indicate the responsibility of SFM for coordination and 
administration of US&R resources. 
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Additionally, the State Emergency Response Plan (SERP) (Florida State 
Firefighter’s Association, 2008) the SFM is the lead agency responsible for the 
management of ESF 4/9 (firefighting and US&R). This is accomplished through the use 
of an Incident Management System (IMS) structure, with pre-designated positions, 
established in the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). Through an agreement, 
the Florida Fire Chiefs Association (FFCA) will provide staff to ESF 4/9 at the SEOC, 
coordinating resource response into the affected region. 
The FFCA provides the coordination for logistical support as requested by ESF 
4/9, as well as other ESFs. The FFCA and SFM have also entered into memoranda of 
understanding (MOU) with the Florida Department of Environmental Protection and the 
Department of Health relating to periods of activations of the SEOC. Under these 
MOU’s, ESF 4/9, ESF 8 (Health/Medical) and ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) will work 
together on the deployment of various response resources including the Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) emergency response personnel and the statewide, multi-
agency Environmental Response Team. The above-mentioned agreements and 
responsibilities involve firefighting personnel and vehicles, similar to the US&R, 
therefore the SFM, by virtue of its experience, is well positioned to coordinate and 
administer FLUSAR. 
Admittedly, for the SFM to take full-time control of FLUSAR, as recommended, 
either existing personnel would have to take on the responsibilities of the FLUSAR 
program, or additional personnel would need to be hired. However, for any other state 
agency to take over this responsibility would necessitate a similar requirement and add a 
significant discipline specific learning curve to learn the functions and terminology for 
the fire resources. 
The last question dealt with addressing the major weaknesses that were identified 
through interviews and the author’s direct experience in working with FLUSAR between 
2004 and 2008. As was mentioned early in this paper, the major weaknesses identified 




liability protection for key, non-fire service related positions that are integral members of 
a US&R task force. These weaknesses need to be addressed immediately to ensure the 
viability of FLUSAR for the future. 
During the course of an interview with Mick Mayers, known authority on fire 
service US&R issues, Chief Fire Officer, former director of South Carolina’s state US&R 
system, and one of the founding members of SUSAR, the lack of a strategic plan is a 
common element in many of the state US&R systems. Even though there are over 40 
state US&R teams and programs represented within the network of SUSAR, according to 
Mayers (personal communication, August 18, 2009), many of them are facing the same 
limitations as FLUSAR; lack of an everyday management or coordinating agency, lack of 
funding and a lack of a strategic plan. 
According to Mayers (2007), “a strategic plan is the ’glue’ that holds the whole 
program together” (p. 52). Besides the planning process being invaluable to determining 
other strengths and weakness of the system, the implementation of a strategic plan is 
essential to the effective operations of an organization such as FLUSAR, as it provides 
the framework and pathway to future success. Simply put, today’s government budget 
and policy-making process are not informed by clearly defined strategies in which 
“means” are prioritized to achieve operational strategic goals. 
As stated earlier, in the case of Florida, US&R is mentioned in the Domestic 
Security Strategy, and in the CEMP; however, there is no other existing strategic 
planning document which contains what the strategic goal is or desired outcome is for 
FLUSAR. According to Quinn (personal communication, May 30, 2009), there is no 
strategic plan for FLUSAR and no plan outlining what resources will be available for the 
long term. 
Furthermore, according to Quinn (personal communication, May 30, 2009) and 
Casey (personal communication, June 20, 2009), immediately after September 11, 2001, 
when Governor Bush called all the directors of state agencies together, he advised then 
Director Napoli that since ESF 4 and 9 were the responsibility of SFM, and even though 
SFM will partner with other organizations in the administration of FLUSAR (such as 
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FASAR and FFCA), the state cannot abdicate its responsibility for the US&R function.  
Since the state has the responsibility for FLUSAR by direction from the governor, as 
outlined in the CEMP and as outlined in Domestic Security Strategy, SFM must exert its 
leadership influence and direct a strategic planning process that will ensure the viability 
of FLUSAR for the future. 
By virtue of its already established ESF 9 responsibility and experience in the 
development of and continued working relationship with FLUSAR, the author 
recommends that the Division of State Fire Marshal establish a FLUSAR advisory board 
of members of the various organizations that presently work within FLUSAR. This 
advisory board should be an offshoot of the already existing Domestic Security Oversight 
Council and would include representatives from FFCA, FASAR, state government, and 
local government. The purpose of the advisory board would be to conduct the strategic 
planning process when the final structure of FLUSR is determined. The strategic 
planning process should include the stakeholders in FLUSAR and should represent local, 
state, and federal representatives to acknowledge the federalism aspect of homeland 
security. 
Another function of the advisory board would be to recommend a funding level 
for sustainment of FLUSAR. This can be accomplished in conjunction with the strategic 
planning process and funding levels can be tied to the accomplishment of periodic 
benchmarks in the planning process. As goals are met in the structure of the organization 
over a specific period of time, funding levels can commensurate with the need for 
sustainment of the system at that time. This also provides for legislators to be able to 
justify to their constituents a funding level that matches the sustainability of a specific 
homeland security function; US&R. 
Additionally this advisory board would be to develop draft legislation to 
strengthen the existence and sustainment of FLUSAR. An example would be the 
legislation necessary to address the last significant weakness, which negatively affects the 
viability of FLUSAR; the lack of liability protection for critical civilian members of a 
US&R task force, specifically, StS and MTM. 
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Both of the positions have a significant role in the work that a US&R task force 
does; however, they are hesitant to carry out their duties due to not having liability 
protection for their professional status. These personnel make important decisions 
regarding the condition of a damaged structure relative to safe entry for US&R personnel 
for removal of victims, and the medical treatment of victims or team personnel. Since 
these personnel are professionals licensed in their primary occupations (engineers and 
medical physicians), they stand to lose a great deal to claims of negligence. 
One of the easiest ways to shield these non-government workers from individual 
civil liability is to make them temporary non-paid employees of the state for purposes of 
affording sovereign immunity. This immunity will extend to the StS and MTM when 
performing tasks outlined within the StS and MTM Position Description and when 
performed at the request of the State Fire Marshal. 
The author recommends the advisory board support either state policy or 
legislation whereby the StS and MTM personnel on the task forces, when activated for 
response or training by the state, be considered an employee of the state, and hence 
afforded the liability protection of the state as an employer. Though this solution may not 
immediately provide the protection of their licensure with their respective boards of 
licensure,  it will at least begin the dialogue at the appropriate levels to accomplish in the 
longer term the necessary legislative revisions to Chapter 633 Florida Statutes to 
formalize jurisdiction of the StS and MTM under the State Fire Marshal and differentiate 
the role of the StS from that of an Engineer as stated in Chapter 471 Florida Statutes and 
Florida Administrative Code, 61G-15, and applicable Department of Health state statutes 
and board designations that affect physicians. 
Finally, the author recommends the State Fire Marshal create a US&R Program 
Coordinator position. This position would possess: 
• Specific knowledge, skills and abilities in the US&R discipline 
• Knowledge of national standards affecting US&R 
• Knowledge of the FLUSAR system, knowledge of the State Homeland 
Security strategy and organization 
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• Knowledge of the state emergency response plan and emergency 
management practices, including interface with an Emergency Operations 
Center 
• Knowledge of the FEMA US&R system 
The US&R Coordinator would work closely with other state agencies that interact 
during incidents that require state resources, or integration of federal resources into an 
existing emergency incident. This position would also be responsible for the day-to-day 
activities related to FLUSAR including funding, training and coordination issues. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Since September 12, 2008, the urban search and rescue system in Florida has 
grown from a nascent system to a full-fledged, multi-tiered, statewide search and rescue 
system. Through an urgent need for US&R capabilities, good planning and a unity of 
purpose after September 11, 2001, Florida was able to establish a system that is emulated 
by other states. However, due to a lack of state control, sustainable funding, a strategic 
plan and policies to protect integral members from professional liability, the system is in 
jeopardy of ceasing to exist. If this were to occur, Florida would not adequately be able to 
protect its citizens during emergencies that cause structural collapse. 
This thesis evaluated the need of Florida to maintain its US&R system within the 
context of the principle of federalism, an evaluation of the present FEMA US&R system 
by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General, Congressional 
testimony on the status of the FEMA US&R system, the need to create a state US&R 
system in Florida after September 11, 2001, and the 2008 Operational and Readiness 
Evaluation of the FLUSAR system. 
This thesis focused on the qualitative information gleaned from the literature 
review, a survey of state USAR systems, interviews with personnel who were involved 
with the establishment of FLUSAR, or have a role in other state’s USAR systems, and 
the author’s experience with the FLUSAR system with state and local governments. 
This thesis also evaluated the present capability of the US&R system within the 
state of Florida and provided a description of where FLUSAR has been, where it is today 
and to recommend changes for the future in order to ensure the highest degree of 
performance and accountability to the citizens of Florida, including recognizing the real 
strength of a US&R system is one that is based on the a rapid, local and regional response 
of specially trained US&R teams and task forces from within a state. 
The author recommends that the Florida Division of State Fire Marshal establish a 
US&R advisory board and US&R program coordinator and dedicate sufficient funding to 
support an advisory board and US&R program coordinator. The benefit of being 
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supported by and also part of a state system ensures familiarity with the geography, 
demographics, and types of common emergencies for that locality, and emergency 
response programs and personnel already existing within that state. This provides for a 
more expeditious, seamless, and coordinated response, which contributes to more 
effectiveness, efficiency and successful outcomes. 
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